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We apply a simple “P-Star” model to explain the inflation process in Sweden for the 
period of the early 1980s to the beginning of 2004. In this context we provide empirical 
considerations on the stability of the demand for a “broadly defined” money function in 
Sweden; the latter being a precondition for money having a reliable impact on (future) 
inflation. Against the background of our theoretical and empirical approach, we find 
that money – when measured by P-star or, alternatively: the “real money gap” – plays 
an important role for explaining inflation in Sweden. Our results might thus suggest that 
money should play a (more) prominent role in the Riksbank’s policy making compared 
to the status quo. 
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  11. Introduction 
After being forced to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
in November 1992, the Riksbank’s Governing Board decided in January 1993 to adopt 
an explicit “inflation targeting” (IT) regime (Heikensten and Vredin (2002), p. 8).
1 The 
bank announced to keep “headline” inflation, measured as the change in the consumer 
price index, to be limited to 2 per cent, with a tolerance of ±1 percentage point. The 
level of inflation targeted by the Riksbank corresponds to that chosen by most other 
central banks that aim monetary policy at price stability, especially those in the 
European Union at that time. Also, the bank chose a headline inflation measure as its 
target since the public was familiar with such a measure. The main purpose of the 
tolerance interval was to indicate that deviations from the target level would probably 
occur and, at the same time, emphasise the Riksbank’s ambition to restrict such 
deviations.  
IT has become a prominent monetary policy concept for central banks in a number of 
countries since the early 1990s. For instance, New Zealand adopted such an approach in 
1989, Canada in 1991, the UK and Finland in 1992. Under IT, which has often been 
characterised as an antipode to monetary targeting (MT), the central bank bases its 
interest rate decision on deviations of the bank’s inflation forecast from its (explicitly) 
pre-announced inflation target. That is, the inflation forecast is actually the key variable 
for monetary policy making. This leads, of course, to the classical question about the 
factors actually driving (future) inflation: Is inflation a “demand pull” or “cost push” 
phenomenon in the Keynesian sense? Or is inflation, according to the dictum of Milton 
Friedman, “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”? 
As of today, many central banks generally hold the view that money is of little use as  
                                                           
1   After allowing for a “transition period”, the framework became operational only from 1995 onwards. 
For a detailed discussion of how IT was put into practise in Sweden, see Svensson (1995).  
  2an indicator for monetary policy aiming at stable and low inflation. This is largely due 
to the assumed instability of money demand relations in economies with well-developed 
financial markets. This general view is also expressed by the Riksbank, which states 
that “(…) technological developments, deregulation and internationalisation have all 
made it more difficult to utilise the quantity of money as an intermediate goal towards a 
final price stability goal.” (Mitlid and Versterlund (2001), p. 23).
2  Against  this 
background, the new theoretical approaches have analysed equilibrium inflation 
determination without any reference to either money supply or demand (see, for 
instance, Woodford (1997)). 
For the period ranging from the second quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 1995 
Baumgartner et al. (2003) showed that narrow money M0 was the most powerful 
leading indicator for Swedish inflation and that broadly defined money M3 as well as 
inflation expectations had significant predictive information for inflation: “Both 
monetary aggregates contain information about inflation sufficiently far into the future 
to allow the policymakers to respond to this information in a meaningful way” 
(Baumgartner et al. (2003), p. 14). Interestingly enough, these findings did not attract 
much attention either in further research on the role of money for future inflation in 
Sweden or in the Riksbank’s actual monetary policy making. In particular, the body of 
empirical analyses on the stability of money demand – which is a prerequisite for 
money having a reliable influence on (future) inflation – is actually scarce to say the 
least.
3 
In what follows, we start with outlining the major characteristics of the Riksbank’s IT 
                                                           
2   It is interesting to note in the current environment of “no money” in monetary policy that Söderström 
(2001) argues that giving a prominent role to money can be a sensible strategy for a central bank 
pursuing IT under discretion as it would make discretionary policy more inertial. 
3  For discussion of the difficulties of sustaining, inter alia, monetary targets as the strategy for controlling 
inflation, see Svensson (1994) or Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). 
  3concept. In this context we will also put forward conceptual and theoretical criticism 
which can be levied against IT as such. In a second step we will outline the “P-Star” 
model, which will form the starting point of explaining the Swedish inflation process. 
This analysis actually includes empirical considerations about the stability of the money 
demand function in Sweden as the latter is a precondition for money having a reliable 
impact on (future) inflation. In this context we also provide the model’s “out-of-sample” 
forecasts for inflation. The analysis concludes with a summary of the findings and an 
outlook on future challenges under a policy framework of IT. 
2. The Riksbank’s inflation targeting concept 
Bernanke et al. (1999) described IT the following way: “Inflation targeting is a 
framework for monetary policy characterised by the public announcement of official 
quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time 
horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is monetary 
policy's primary long-run goal. Among other important features of inflation targeting 
are vigorous efforts to communicate with the public about the plans and objectives of 
the monetary authorities, and, in many cases, mechanisms that strengthen the central 
bank's accountability for attaining those objectives.”
4  
In line with this widely accepted definition, the Riksbank has shown an increasing 
desire to formulate explicit and increasingly precise objectives for monetary policy, in 
particular numerical inflation targets (Heikensten and Vredin (2002), p.6). Moreover, 
steps have been taken to create an institutional setting that makes the central bank 
strongly committed to its objectives, in particular making the central bank politically 
                                                           
4  See also Svensson (1999).  
  4independent.
5 Also, the central bank has developed particular decision making processes 
in which inflation forecasts play a very important role. Finally, the Riksbank has taken 
great efforts to render its policy more transparent because this makes it easier for the 
public to understand the central bank’s actions. An explicit objective also makes it 
easier for the public at large to evaluate monetary policy and hold the central bank 
accountable for its decisions, thereby making policy more credible from the point of 
view of market agents.  
As far as the policy objective is concerned, the Riksbank makes, in addition to headline 
inflation, use of various “core inflation” measures that exclude certain price components 
such as, for instance, indirect taxes and subsidies as well as house mortgage interest 
payments. In fact, the bank has decided not to use one specific core index for all 
situations. The intention instead is always to communicate exactly on what forecast or 
other grounds the interest rate decision has been based and which deviations from the 
target are acceptable in any given situation because of temporary supply shocks. Figure 
1 summarizes the Riksbank’s inflation measures. Figure 2 shows the latest 
developments of Swedish inflation measures. As can be seen, inflation has declined in 
recent years, developing more or less closely aligned to the bank’s stability promise.  
- Insert Figure 1 here - 
- Insert Figure 2 here - 
In general there is agreement that a pre-emptive, forward-looking monetary policy such 
as IT shall take action if and when there is a divergence between expected, or projected 
( ) and envisaged ( ) inflation. The policy recommendation under an IT framework 
could be described as follows: 
e
t π t ˆ π
                                                           
5    The new Constitution and amended Riksbank Act came into effect in 1999 granting political 
independence to the central bank. The Riksbank Act now states that the “objective of the Riksbank’s 
operations shall be to maintain price stability.” See Heikensten and Vredin (2002, p. 9).  
  5(1)  .  ) ˆ ( f i t
e
t π π λ
π − = ∆
The central bank would have to increase (decrease) the interest rate, i, that is ∆i > 0 (∆i 
< 0), if expected future inflation exceeds target inflation;   > 0 shows the intensity 
with which rates are changed in response to the expected deviation from target inflation. 
From the point of view of monetary policy, it seems advisable to analyse risks to price 
stability by taking into account both monetary and non-monetary variables. Such an 
analysis would combine Milton Friedman’s dictum that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon” with the fact that consumer prices are also 
temporarily influenced by “cost push” and “demand pull” variables (for instance, 
variations in the output gap, the oil price, the wage level and the exchange rate). 
π λ
In this context it should be noted that conceptually, IT and MT are much more closely 
aligned than most discussions would suggest.
6  Both concepts aim to keep (future) 
inflation in check; both favour a pre-emptive stance for monetary policy; and both 
favour policy-making on the basis of inflation forecasts. MT proponents would argue 
for using money supply as the central inflation indicator, whereas those in favour of IT 
recommend a central bank’s “self-made” inflation forecast as the main guideline for 
policy-making. That is, MT and IT would be identical if money supply were used as the 
inflation forecast variable. The only difference remaining in such a case would be that 
MT has an explicitly announced money growth target and an implicit inflation goal, 
whereas IT has an explicit inflation target and an implicit money growth goal. In view 
of the above, it is fair to say that IT could be characterised as an “umbrella strategy” 
under which money supply and other variables can be analysed in order to identify risks 
for future price stability.  
- Figure 3 about here - 
                                                           
6  For an insightful comparison between MT and IT, see, for instance, Baltensperger (2000). 
  6Under IT, a central bank’s inflation forecast plays the key role in policy making. 
However, it is not quite clear how such forecasts are actually calculated. Of course, in 
its quarterly Inflation Reports the Riksbank provides – along with its inflation forecasts 
one to two years ahead, and nowadays there is also a brief outlook three years ahead – 
some input variables for its forecasts. At the same time, however, it is not at all clear 
which role each variable plays, e.g. which weight is assigned to it in the Riksbank’s 
forecasting exercise.
7 In fact, its inflation forecasts – as is the case with other central 
bank pursuing IT – appear to emerge from a kind of “black box”, which would imply a 
great deal of discretion on the part of the forecasters. This conjecture is actually 
confirmed by the bank: “(…) the Riksbank’s forecasts (like those of other central banks) 
are largely determined by judgement.” (Jansson and Vredin (2001), p. 206). 
A wide scope of discretion in calculating the Riksbank’s IT inflation forecast might not 
only raise questions about the actual “transparency” of its monetary policy: if the bank 
derives the essential policy making variable on an “ad hoc” basis and under a rather 
opaque procedure, it could well be that in a “period of stress” (such as, for instance, big 
financial market and/or cost push crises) the public looses confidence in the bank’s 
assessment. (Interestingly enough, even the most vigorous advocates of central bank 
policy transparency seem to be satisfied with the actual status quo.) It might also raise 
questions about the actual empirically reliable relation between (future) inflation and its 
“driving forces”. That is, we try to shed some more light on the actual role money plays 
in the inflation process in Sweden. To this end, we will make use of the well-known “P-
                                                           
7 “The discussion of Swedish inflation is more or less based on an expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
framework. Thus, supply and demand conditions in the Swedish economy are discussed along with 
various measures of the “output gap”, and the picture of inflation is elaborated with inflation 
expectations and possible supply shocks.“ (Heikensten and Vredin (2002), p. 16). It is interesting to 
note in this context that Baumgartner et al. (2003, p. 5) note: ”(…) the output gap (…) has some 
predictive information on inflation, but the predictive information of the output gap is confined to a 
shorter horizon than the monetary aggregates (…).” 
  7star” model.  
3. The “P-Star” model 
To set the ball rolling, Figure 4 shows the annual rise in consumer price inflation (left 
hand scale) and the income velocity of the stock of M3 (right hand scale) in Sweden for 
the period Q1 85 to Q1 04.
8 As can be seen, there is a certain co-movement between the 
swings of inflation and the behavior of the velocity of money: rising (falling) inflation 
seem to be associated with upwards (downward) swings in the velocity of money. That 
is, “swings” in the velocity of money or, to put it differently, swings in the demand for 
money, seem to be accompanied by movements in inflation. This finding, however, is 
by no means “spurious” when taken into account the well-known “transaction equation” 
and – on the basis of this – the so-called “P-star” model. We will now look into this in 
more detail. 
- Insert Figure 4 here - 
For setting up an inflation forecasting model for Sweden, we make use of the well-
known “transaction equation” which can be written as follows:  
P Y V M ⋅ = ⋅ ,       (1) 
where M is the stock of money, V the velocity of money, Y real output and P price level. 
Equation (1) simply says that the stock of money, multiplied by the number of times a 
money unit is used for financing purposes, equals the real output valued with its price 
level. Taking logarithms, equation (1) can easily be written as: 
p y v m + = + .          ( 2 )  
Now let us turn to the “P-star” model (Hallman, Porter and Small (1991)). To start with, 
                                                           
8 The velocity of money is the frequency with which a money unit is used to finance nominal output in 
the period under review. Economically speaking, the velocity of money is the reciprocal of the demand 
for money. It is simply calculated by dividing nominal GDP by the stock of money. 
  8the actual price level is simply: 
y v m p − + = .          ( 3 )  
The long-term price level can be formalised as: 
* * * y v m p − + = ,           ( 4 )  
where asterisks represent the long-run or equilibrium values. The difference between 
equations (4) and (3) is the so-called price gap:  
*) ( ) * ( * y y v v p p − + − = − .          ( 5 )  
The price gap (  consists of (i) the liquidity gap ( *) p p − *) v v −  and (ii) the output gap 
. If, for instance, actual output exceeds potential ( ) * ( y y − ) y * y <  and actual velocity 
equals the long-term equilibrium (v = v*), the actual price level can be expected to rise 
in the future. The price gap can also be written as:  
* * * ) ( ) ( y p v m p p − − + = − .         ( 6 )  
According to equation (6), the price gap is a function of the “output gap”, that is the 
difference between actual and potential GDP, and the “liquidity gap”, defined as the 
difference between the equilibrium velocity of money and its actual value. It is 
important to note that an increase in real GDP (y) will not cause a change of the price 
gap, because v will decrease as y increases. Equation (6) shows that the price gap is 
independent from the output gap: it is simply the difference between real money 
(adjusted by the trend velocity) and real potential output. Figure 5 shows the output gap 
and the price gap for Sweden.  
- Figure 5 about here - 
Lately, there is an alternative version of the price gap, namely the “real money gap” 
(Gerlach and Svensson (2001)). It is defined as actual money supply less actual price 
  9level: 
p m mreal − = .            ( 7 )  
The equilibrium real money holding is: 
*
* p m mreal − = .           ( 8 )  
The difference between equation (7) und (8) is the real money gap, which represents 
nothing other than the price gap with a negative sign: 
*) ( * *) ( ) (
* p p p p p m p m m m real real − − = + − = − − − = − .     (9) 
The real money gap is thus very closely affiliated with the so-called P-star model.
9 It is 
crucial to identify a stable velocity of money or, equivalently, a stable demand function 
for money. Only when there is a stable demand for money, monetary signals might 
contain information for future inflation. This issue will be dealt with what follows next. 
4. Identifying a stable demand function for money 
Theory suggests that holdings of real balances depend, in the simplest case, on output 
and interest rates, that is opportunity costs of money holdings. An increase (decline) in 
output should be accompanied with rising (falling) demand for transaction balances. As 
a result, the income elasticity of money should be positive. The higher (lower) the 
opportunity costs of real money holdings are, the lower (higher) should be the demand 
for real balances. Also, a rise (decline) in the own rate on deposits included in the 
monetary aggregate can be expected to increase (reduce) the demand for real money. A 
parsimoniously specified type money demand can thus be written as follows: 
                                                           
9   Against the background of these findings, it is easily shown that a simple comparison between actual 
money growth and an annual growth rate (such as, for instance, represented by the ECB’s reference 
value concept) might lead to misleading policy signals as monetary expansions, which occurred in the 





t t t t i i y p m ε β β β β + + − + = − 3 2 1 0        ( 1 0 )  
where m is the logarithm of money, p is the price level, y represents real GDP and i are 
interest rates, and ε is the error term. The ßs are the parameter to be estimated.  
To analyse the stability of money demand functions, the cointegration analysis 
suggested by Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) has become the 
standard econometric approach (see Appendices C to E for further details). Without 
going into detail at this juncture, the rationale of the procedure is to identify linear 
relationships between non-stationary variables, in our case real money, output, interest 
rates and inflation. Moreover, our multivariate approach can be subject to various 
restrictions. For instance, we assumed that there are linear combinations between (i) real 
M3 holdings, real GDP and interest rates and (ii) short-term interest rates, long-term 
rates and inflation. The first assumption actually implies the existence of a demand for 
money function, the second assumes that the “term structure of interest rates” and the 
“Fisher parity” jointly hold. Our approach therefore amounts to a structural vector error 
correction model (S-VECM), a special case of the structural vector auto regression 













































) 80 . 0 ( ) 6 . 1 (
) 04 . 0 ( ) 19 . 0 (
11 . 0 1 7 . 10 0 0
0 25 . 0 0 35 . 1 1
' ˆ β      ( 1 1 )  
The first vector represents the demand for money function. The income elasticity of 
money is 1.31, which is economically plausible and broadly in line with other studies.
10 
                                                           
10  The finding that the income elasticity exceeds 1 can be explained by the „omitted wealth effect”, 
which leads to a decline of the velocity of money over time. 
  11The demand for balances rises (declines) when the opportunity costs declines (rises). 
Also, the demand for real money increases (declines) if the own yield on money deposit 
increases (declines). The second vector actually implies that the term structure of 
interest rates and the Fisher parity hold (that is that they are jointly stationary). We also 
tested the system using a measure of core inflation, ∆cpicoret. (Fore the co-movement 
of headline and core inflation see Figure 6.) The analysis yields the following results, 












































) 13 . 0 ( ) 7 . 1 (
) 04 . 0 ( ) 19 . 0 (
19 . 0 1 3 . 15 0 0
0 26 . 0 0 43 . 1 1
' ˆ β      ( 1 2 )  
We take these findings as sufficient to consider the demand for M3 function as 
reasonably stable. That is, we will set up an inflation forecasting model using the price 
gap as an inflation determining factor.  
- Insert Figure 6 here - 
5. Inflation estimating model and out-of-sample forecasts 
In view of the findings above, our inflation forecasting model describes the dynamics of 
inflation as follows: 
∑
=
− + + + + − + =
n
i
t t i t i t t t N p p
1
1 0 1 ) * ( ε π β β β π       ( 1 3 )  
where  1 + t π  is future inflation.  t t p p − *  is the price gap (see equation (6)). If the actual 
price level is lower (higher) than the equilibrium level, future inflation will accelerate 
(slow down) to close the “gap”. As a result, one would expect the parameter  1 β  to be 
positive. Given the “stickiness” of inflation, we also take into account past inflation as 
  12shown by ∑ .   represents a vector of non-monetary “cost push” variables (oil, 







π β t N
t ε  is the (i.i.d.) error term.  
We regressed inflation – expressed as the first difference of the log consumer price 
index – on own lagged values (for doing justice to the “stickiness” of the inflation 
process), and (first changes in the logs of) various variables, namely the price gap (pg), 
output gap (og), oil prices (oil), the USDSEK exchange rate (exsek), unemployment rate 
(u) and nominal wages (w). Figure 7 shows the regression results and a selection of 
diagnosis tests for the period Q3 84 to Q1 04. The equation explains 79% of the 
variance in the change of inflation and appears to be stable according to standard tests. 
This finding is also confirmed when various sub-periods are tested. For instance, Figure 
8 shows an out-of-sample calculation where the parameters were established for the 
(sub-)period Q3 84 to Q4 95. 
- Insert Figure 7 here - 
- Insert Figure 8 here - 
It is interesting to note that the price gap enters the forecasting model with a time lag of 
five quarters whereas the output proved to be insignificant according to standard tests. 
That said, the past (current) values of the changes in the price gap exert a rather strong 
impact on current (future) inflation. Given the latest benign development of the price 
gap, there is only very moderate upward pressure on the consumer price level around 
the beginning of 2004. Figure 9 shows impulse-response functions for real money 
holdings and real output due to a change in the interest rate and the response of the 
long-term interest rate and inflation following a shock to the real money supply. The 
variables under review reveal economically plausible reactions.  
- Insert Figure 9 here - 
  13It is possible for an equation that has a very good statistical fit to have a very poor 
simulation or forecast fit. For this reason, we finally make use of both static and 
dynamic out-of-sample forecasts. Static forecasting performs a series of one-step ahead 
forecasts of the dependent inflation variable, while dynamic forecasting relies on a 
multi-step forecast of inflation. Both methods yield identical results for the first forecast 
period. However, the two methods will differ for subsequent periods since there are 
lagged dependent variables included in our empirical model. Let us start now with the 
static out-of-sample forecast which starts in the first quarter of 1996. 
Static forecasts  
Figure 10 plots the inflation forecasts with plus and minus two standard error bands 
which provide a 95% forecast interval and report a table of statistical results evaluating 
our static forecast. The first two forecast error statistics depend on the scale of the 
dependent variable and hence should be used to compare forecasts for the inflation rate 
across different models. The popular Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) turns out to be 
small and implicitly weights large forecast errors more heavily than small ones and is 
appropriate in situations in which the cost of an error increases as the square of that 
error. In addition, the mean absolute deviation is rather small. This appears to be more 
important in our IT context since the cost of inflation forecast errors is proportional to 
the absolute size of the forecast error and not so much to the percentage error as 
implicitly assumed by the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) (see, for instance, 
Kennedy (2003), pp. 361). 
- Insert Figure 10 here - 
However, we emphasize the remaining two statistics which are scale invariant. The 
Theil inequality coefficient always lies between zero and one, where zero indicates a 
perfect fit. Our forecast appears to be rather good since Theil falls below 50% and the 
  14bias and variance proportions are so small that most of the bias is concentrated on the 
covariance proportions. Hence, the mean of the forecast is not far away from the mean 
of the actual series. The same is valid for the variation of our forecast (see, e.g., Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1991), chapter 12). Also the MAPE turns out to be small. However, note 
that a well-known problem connected with this indicator is that it promotes a kind of 
underestimating due to the fact that the actual and not the forecasted value is the base 
for calculating the percentage error. Figure 11 shows the results.  
- Insert Figure 11 here - 
Dynamic Forecast 
The first forecasted quarter of our dynamic forecast is Q1 96. Figure 12 plots the 
inflation forecasts with plus and minus two standard error bands which provide a 95% 
forecast interval and report a table of statistical results evaluating our dynamic forecast. 
- Insert Figure 12 here - 
Again, like in the static forecast case, the forecast evaluation leads to a rather positive 
assessment of our empirical model. The RMSE and the MAPE turn out to be small 
again. The Theil inequality coefficient is nearly unchanged in spite of our change from a 
static to a dynamic forecast perspective. However, the bias and variance proportions are 
slightly higher than before. Hence, the mean and the variance of the forecast are more 
far away from the mean and the variation of the actual series, a finding typical for and 
inherent in dynamic forecasts. Finally, also the MAPE turns out to be small, and thus 
acceptable. Figure 13 shows the actual and dynamically forecasted inflation. 
- Insert Figure 13 here - 
  156. Summary and outlook  
Applying the P-star model to Swedish data from the early 1980 to 2004 suggests that 
broadly defined money, measured by the concept of P-star or real money gap, plays an 
important role in explaining Swedish inflation. This finding rests on the observation that 
the demand for money function, e.g. the income velocity of money, appears to be stable 
in the long-run. Our findings are supported by statistically satisfactory out-of-sample 
inflation forecasts based on the P-star approach. Our findings on the role of money for 
future inflation may come as a surprise as the Riksbank has not assigned – at least 
explicitly – any important role to the stock of money in its monetary policy making. Our 
findings may thus provide a basis from which further research on whether money 
should in fact be assigned an intermediate function in the Riksbank’s policy making 
could be done. 
Moreover, our findings may also be taken as a starting point to discuss some “weak 
spots” in the Riksbank’s IT approach. Perhaps most importantly in this context, it 
should be mentioned that – despite the successful policy results in recent years – there is 
little evidence that could inspire confidence in the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts playing 
an important role of determining future inflation. The well-known phenomenon of 
“surprise inflation” – that is actual inflation in excess of market agents’ originally 
expected inflation – attests to this. The role of excess money as measured by the real 
money gap, in turn, provides a theoretically and empirically sound explanation of the 
policy transmission mechanism linking monetary policy action with the ultimate policy 
target, that is consumer price inflation. 
To the outside world, inflation forecasts are rather opaque: it is not quite clear which 
variables are included in the projection model; nor is it known how much weight is 
assigned to each of the variables. So the public’s confidence in the accuracy of the 
  16inflation projections – and the appropriateness of its policy recommendations – can be 
assumed to hinge de facto on the bank’s credibility, that is the bank’s perceived 
willingness and ability to deliver on its price stability promise. It therefore seems 
questionable whether inflation forecasts themselves further monetary policy 
transparency and build up central bank credibility. It seems to work more the other way 
round: Inflation projections (or forecasts) are only reliable if central bank credibility is 
already in place. 
Finally, IT has gained in prominence in a period in which world wide inflation was set 
to decline – for reasons that might have been well beyond the factors considered 
important in the traditional IT approach. For instance, the political, financial and 
operational independency granted to numerous central banks – including the Riksbank – 
should have played a role in making monetary policy credible from the point of view 
and bringing inflation down to the desired levels. In the Swedish case, though, our 
findings show in particular that the decline in the real money gap seems to be at the 
heart of the disinflation process, i.e. in bringing inflation to the envisaged level. This 
result would indeed suggest that the Riksbank might have to assign a (more) prominent 
role to money in setting its policy compared to the status quo. 
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A   The price gap  
To derive P-star, a simple demand for money function may be used: 
ε β β + − + = i y p m 2 1 ,           ( A 1 )  
where m is the (log) of the stock of nominal money, p the price level and i the interest 
rate, e.g. the opportunity costs of holding money. The parameter  1 β  represents  the 
income elasticity of money,  2 β  is the (semi-)elasticity of money demand. The term ε  
represents the error term. In the long run, or equilibrium, nominal money holdings can 
be described as follows: 
* * * 2 1 i y p m β β − + = ,           ( A 2 )  
whereas the asterisks stand for long-term, that is equilibrium, values. The difference 
between the current money stock and the equilibrium money stock is the “money gap”: 
ε β β + − − − = − *) ( *) ( * 2 1 i i y y m m .         ( A 3 )  
Instead of measuring these disequilibria in units of the (logarithmic) money stock, they 
can also be expressed in an equivalent manner in units of the (logarithmic) price level. 
To do this, the equilibrium price level (P-star) is defined as the price level that would 
emerge given the current holdings of money if both the goods market and the money 
market were in equilibrium: 
* * * 2 1 i y m p β β + − = .           ( A 4 )  
The equilibrium price level is thus an indicator of the level of goods prices that would 
emerge over the longer term given the existing money stock if the disequilibria (y – y*, i 
– i*, ε) had disappeared. As may easily be seen, the price gap and the money gap are 
identical:ε β β + − − − = − *) ( *) ( * 2 1 i i y y p p ,         ( A 5 )  
so that we can write: 
ε + − = − ) * ( * m m p p           ( A 6 )  
B Data 
Nominal and real GDP, consumer prices, interest rates, the oil price and exchange rates 
were taken from Thomson Financials. The stock of M3 was taken from the Riksbank 
and was seasonally adjusted (Census X12). Core consumer prices were taken from the 
OECD. Except for interest rates, all variables are seasonally adjusted and were used in 
the form of natural logarithms.  
C  Overview of the Johansen cointegration approach  
The finding that many macro time series may contain a unit root has spurred the 
development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis. Engle and Granger 
(1987) pointed out that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary series may 
be stationary. If such a stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time 
series are said to be cointegrated. The stationary linear combination is called the 
cointegrating equation and may be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship 
among the variables. 
The purpose of the cointegration test is to determine whether a group of non-stationary 
series are cointegrated or not. As explained below, the presence of a cointegrating 
relation forms the basis of the vector error correction (VEC) specification. To outline 
the Johansen (1991, 1995) cointegration technique, consider a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model of the order p:  
t t p t p t t Bx y A y A y ε + + + + = − − ... 1 1              ( A 1 )where   is a -vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, x  is a d-vector of deterministic 
variables, and 
t y t


























Granger’s representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix Π has reduced 
rank r < k, then there exist k x r matrices α and β each with rank r such that Π =  ' ß α  and 
 is I(0). r is the number of cointegrating relations (the rank) and each column of ß is 
the cointegrating vector. The elements of α are known as the adjustment parameters in 
the VEC model. Johansen's method is to estimate the Π from an unrestricted VAR and 
to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced rank of Π.  
t y ß'
To determine the number of cointegrating relations conditional on the assumptions 
made about the trend, one can proceed sequentially from r = 0 to r = k – 1 until one fails 
to reject.  
The trace statistic reported in the first block tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations, where k is the number of 
endogenous variables, for r = 0, 1, …, k – 1. The alternative of k cointegrating relations 
corresponds to the case where none of the series has a unit root and a stationary VAR 
may be specified in terms of the levels of all of the series. The trace statistic for the null 
hypothesis of r cointegrating relations is computed as: 







) 1 log( λwhere  i λ  is the i-th largest eigenvalue of the Π matrix in (A3) which is reported in the 
second column of the output table. The maximum eigenvalue statistic shows the results 
of testing the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the alternative of r + 1 
cointegrating relations. This test statistic is computed as: 
max LR (r|r + 1)   = − ) 1 log( 1 + + r T λ          ( A 5 )  
   =   LR (r|k) –  (r|r + 1)  tr tr LR
for r = 0, 1, …, k – 1.D  Cointegration Analysis, Headline Inflation 
Table A2: Cointegration rank tests 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized    Trace  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value Critical Value
None **   0.593715   140.7056   68.52   76.07 
At most 1 **   0.394824   67.74881   47.21   54.46 
At most 2   0.185623   27.06776   29.68   35.65 
At most 3   0.119402   10.43590   15.41   20.04 
At most 4   0.001682   0.136394    3.76    6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
     
Hypothesized    Max-Eigen  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value Critical Value
None **   0.593715   72.95678   33.46   38.77 
At most 1 **   0.394824   40.68105   27.07   32.24 
At most 2   0.185623   16.63186   20.97   25.52 
At most 3   0.119402   10.29951   14.07   18.63 
At most 4   0.001682   0.136394    3.76    6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 
1% levels Table A3: Test of hypothesis about the conintegration space 
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1,B(1,3)=0,B(1,5)=0 
      B(2,1)=0,B(2,2)=0,B(2,4)=1 
Maximum iterations (500) reached. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
Chi-square(2)   4.781542   
Probability   0.091559   
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1  CointEq2 
LNM3(-1)-LNCPI(-1)   1.000000   0.000000 
    
LNGDPR(-1) -1.355166    0.000000 
   (0.19241)   
 [-7.04301]   
    
SW10Y(-1)   0.000000  -10.78579 
     (1.16628) 
   [-9.24806] 
    
SW3M(-1)   0.246110   1.000000 
   (0.03906)   
 [  6.30003]   
    
D(LNCPI(-1))   0.000000  -106.0225 
     (80.3483) 
   [-1.31954] 
    
C   16.57327   1.098341 E   Cointegration Analysis, Core Inflation 
Table A4: Cointegration rank tests 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
Hypothesized    Trace  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value Critical Value
None **   0.576955   139.4359   68.52   76.07 
At most 1 **   0.410480   69.75338   47.21   54.46 
At most 2   0.178335   26.94924   29.68   35.65 
At most 3   0.127339   11.03905   15.41   20.04 
At most 4   7.61E-05   0.006161    3.76    6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
     
Hypothesized    Max-Eigen  5 Percent  1 Percent 
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value Critical Value
None **   0.576955   69.68248   33.46   38.77 
At most 1 **   0.410480   42.80413   27.07   32.24 
At most 2   0.178335   15.91020   20.97   25.52 
At most 3   0.127339   11.03289   14.07   18.63 
At most 4   7.61E-05   0.006161    3.76    6.65 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 
1% levels Table A5: Test of hypothesis about the conintegration space 
Cointegration Restrictions:  
      B(1,1)=1,B(1,3)=0,B(1,5)=0 
      B(2,1)=0,B(2,2)=0,B(2,4)=1 
Maximum iterations (500) reached. 
Restrictions identify all cointegrating vectors 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 2):  
Chi-square(2)   3.435574   
Probability   0.179463   
Cointegrating Eq:   CointEq1  CointEq2 
LNM3(-1)-LNCPIC(-1)  1.000000   0.000000 
    
LNGDPR(-1) -1.431439    0.000000 
   (0.19681)   
 [-7.27321]   
    
SW10Y(-1)   0.000000  -15.30001 
     (1.69988) 
   [-9.00062] 
    
SW3M(-1)   0.258439   1.000000 
   (0.03795)   
 [  6.81002]   
    
D(LNCPIC(-1))   0.000000  -198.5671 
     (128.957) 
   [-1.53979] 
    
C   16.61850   2.006364 Figure 1: Swedish inflation measures 
Consumer price index (CPI): The change in the CPI measures how the prices of 
goods and services for private consumption develop over time.  
Underlying inflation (UND1X): CPI inflation excluding household mortgage 
interest expenditure and the direct effects of changes in taxes and subsidies.  
Domestic underlying inflation (UNDINHX): UND1X excluding mainly imported 
goods and services.  
Imported underlying inflation (UNDIMPX): UND1X excluding mainly 
domestically produced goods and services.  
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP): An EU-harmonised index that 
was developed to measure inflation in the EU and that enables comparisons 
between EU countries. A significant part of the changes in housing costs that are 
included in the CPI are not included in the HICP. However, the HICP includes 
certain components that are currently excluded from the CPI, such as charges for 
childcare and care of the elderly.  
 
 















































































Inflation (LS) M3 velocity (RS)
 
Source: Riksbank, Thomson Financials; own calculations. The income velocity of M3 is calculated by 




















0.04 Price gap (LS) Output gap (RS)
 


























Source: Riksbank, Thomson Financials; own calculations. Fourth differences of log values. Core inflation 
= CPI excluding energy and food.  Figure 7: Estimating Changes in Inflation, Q3 84 to Q1 04 
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R
2 = .79  S.E. of regression = 0.0044. – LM test (2) = .34 (.71), LM test (4) 
= .29 (.88), LM test (8) = 1.61 (.14). – ARCH test (2) =.33 (.71), 
ARCH test (4) = .56 (.69), ARCH test (8) = .66 (.73). – WHITE 
(no cross terms) = .49 (.95) WHITE = .67 (.89).  
Data source: Source: Riksbank, Thomson Financials, Bloomberg; own calculations. Legend: ln = natural 
logarithm, cpi = log of consumer price index, pgm3 = price gap on the basis of the stock of money M3, 
oil = oil price in US$, exsek = Swedish Krona US-dollar exchange rate, DUM901, DUM921, DUM 931 
and DUM981 represent dummy variables which takes on the value of 1 on Q1 90, Q1 92, Q1 93 and Q1 
98, respectively, and zero otherwise. All variables enter the equation in logarithms.   represents the first 





















0.12 Estimate, full sample Estimate, sample ending Q4 95 Actual
 
Source: Riksbank, Thomson Financials, Bloomberg; own calculations. Actual inflation is based on the 
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Response of D(LNCPI) to LNM3-LNCPI
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
 
Source: Riksbank, Thomson Financials; own calculations.  
 







96  97  98  99  00 01 02 03
D  L  N  CPIF
Forecast: DLNC  P  I  F 
Actual: D(LNCP  I  ) 
Forecast sample  :     1  9  9  6  :  1     2  0  0  4  :  1 
Included observ  a  t  i  o  n  s  :     3  3 
Root Mean Squared Error   0.004041
Mean Absolute Error        0.002911
Mean Abs. Percent Error   1.396882
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.443157
      Bias Proportion          0.012753
      Variance Proportion   0.048242
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Forecast: DLNC  P  I  F 
Actual: D(LNCP  I  ) 
Forecast sample  :     1  9  9  6  :  1     2  0  0  4  :  1 
Included observ  a  t  i  o  n  s  :     3  3 
Root Mean Squared Error   0.004451
Mean Absolute Error        0.003273
Mean Abs. Percent Error   6.079383
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.449356
      Bias Proportion          0.156703
      Variance Proportion   0.075484
      Covariance Proportion   0.767813
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